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ABSTRACT 
Wages  in  domestically-  owned  Indonesian  manufacturing  plants  taken  over  by  foreign  firms
increased sharply between the year before takeover and two years after takeover, relative to plants
remaining in domestic ownership.  Blue- collar wage levels in these plants had been less than 10 per
cent above and white- collar wages more than 10 per cent below those in their industries a year
before takeover.  Two years after takeover both were more than 50 per cent above average.  Wages
in foreign plants taken over by domestic owners tended to rise less than average for their industries,
although they remained above the domestic average.  Thus, foreign firms did not select particularly
high- wage plants to take over and it was foreign takeovers, rather than takeovers in general, that led
to large wage increases and high wages.
An econometric analysis of the whole panel found that both foreign ownership throughout
the period and foreign takeover resulted in higher wages relative to domestically- owned plants.  The
wage  effects  for  white-  collar  employees  were  typically  around  twice  those  for  blue-  collar
employees.  Foreign takeovers were associated with large increases in blue- collar employment and
both foreign and domestic takeovers with declines in white- collar employment.  However, the
employment changes were not strongly related to the wage changes.
Robert E. Lipsey Fredrik Sjöholm
National Bureau of Economic Research European Institute for Japanese Studies
365 Fifth Ave. Suite 5318  Stockholm School of Economics
New York, NY 10016 P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm
and NBER SWEDEN
Rlipsey@gc.cuny.edu Fredrik.Sjoholm@hhs.se  1 
FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING WAGES:  
AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA 
 
Fredrik Sjöholm and Robert E. Lipsey 
 
I. Introduction 
Many studies have found that affiliates of foreign firms pay higher wages than locally- 
owned firms in their host countries.  That is generally true in both developed and developing host 
countries.
1  In most cases, some margin in favor of employees of foreign- owned firms remains 
even after industry, location, and establishment characteristics are taken into account.
2 In one of 
the few cases in which labor quality could be taken into account, beyond the distinction between 
production and non- production workers, it still seemed clear that foreign firms in Indonesia paid 
a wage premium in 1996 (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2004).  
There are several suggestions as to why foreign firms would pay higher wages than 
domestic firms. For instance, foreign firms might try to prevent technological spillovers through 
labor turnover by paying a wage premium (Fosfuri, Motta, and Ronde  2001); the wage premium 
might be caused by rent-sharing arrangements between foreign firms and their employees (Budd, 
Konings, and Slaughter 2005); as compensation for a higher labor demand volatility in foreign 
plants (Fabri, Haskel, and Slaughter 2003); or as compensation for a higher foreign plant closure 
rate (Bernard and Sjöholm 2003). 
                                                       
1 See for instance Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1997), Doms and Jensen (1998), Feliciano and 
Lipsey (2006), and Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2001). 
2 See Lipsey (2004) for a summary of the literature on FDI and wages.   2 
However, while the existence of higher wages in foreign- owned plants is well 
documented, it would be premature to conclude from that fact alone that foreign ownership 
causes high wages. For example, the correlation between foreign ownership and wages is 
sometimes attributed to selectivity bias: the selection of high- wage establishments for 
acquisition by foreign firms, so called “cherry-picking”.  There may be unmeasured 
characteristics of individual firms or establishments that are associated with both high wages and 
foreign ownership. From a host-country policy perspective, it is clearly the question of whether 
FDI causes high wages that is of interest. 
Another possibility is that wages in foreign-owned firms are higher than those in 
domestically-owned firms because many of the cases of foreign ownership result from takeovers 
of existing firms, rather than new establishments, and there is a considerable literature, mainly 
referring to developed countries, that finds that acquisitions themselves result in wage increases, 
regardless of the nationality of the acquiring firms.   For instance, Brown and Medoff (1988) find 
a positive wage effect of acquisitions in the state of Michigan in the US, as do McGuckin, 
Nguyen, Sang, and Reznek (1995) for acquisitions in the American food industry. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1992), in a study of acquisitions in the American manufacturing sector find a 
negative effect on white collar wages and no effect on blue collar wages. One possible 
explanation to a general positive effect of takeovers on wages could be a strategy by new owners 
to keep personnel and their firm specific knowledge in the company (Heyman, Sjöholm, and 
Tingvall 2006, p.18). Such knowledge of the firm and its networks might be essential if the new 
owners are to make a profit from a new firm. Secondly, an acquisition might also be taken as an 
opportunity to renegotiate contracts and to perform organizational changes (Schleifer and 
Summers, 1988; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Ownership changes are typically followed   3 
by a “shake out”: a period of rationalizations. The remaining workers might require a wage 
premium to stay with the company during such changes.  
One implication for our study is that the increased wages after foreign takeovers might be 
caused by two different components. One is the fact of takeover itself and the other is the change 
to foreign ownership.  We try to distinguish between these by examining foreign and domestic 
takeovers separately. 
We attempt here to establish as conclusively as possible whether foreign ownership itself 
raised wages in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. Our advantage in this effort comes mainly 
from the fact that we can use panel data in place of the cross-sectional data that has been used in 
previous studies. With this long panel of Indonesian data, and our ability to follow 
establishments after both foreign and domestic takeovers, we demonstrate that foreign ownership 
or acquisition of an Indonesian manufacturing plant results in higher wages for the plant’s 
employees, and that domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned plants do not result in corresponding 
wage gains. This is an important issue not only academically, but for countries deciding on 
policies toward foreign ownership.  
 
II. Panel data on Indonesian manufacturing 
  We analyze Indonesian manufacturing data supplied by the Indonesian Statistical Office. 
The data include all manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees in any of the years 1975-
1999. Inclusion of plant identification codes enables us to construct a panel and follow the plants 
over time. The number of plants in the Indonesian manufacturing sector increased from 7,355 in   4 
1975 to 22,041 in 1999 and the number of plants with foreign ownership from 263 to 1,710.
3 The 
maximum time a plant could be present is 24 years, if the plant existed in 1975. However, most 
plants were established after 1987, so that their maximum period would be 12 years or less. The 
average period in the sample is 7.6 years and the median, 6 years. The exit rate is about 7 
percent, indicating that plants that enter the manufacturing sector tended to remain.  
The foreign share of Indonesian manufacturing employment and value added is shown in 
table 1. The foreign share in 1985 was only ten percent of employment and 21 percent of value 
added. However, an economic crisis in the mid 1980s, caused by falling prices of oil and other 
raw materials, forced Indonesia to liberalize its FDI regime from around 1986. The result was a 
sharp increase in the relative importance of FDI, to about 21 percent of employment and 36 
percent of value added in 1999. The foreign presence is relative low in Food products, Wood 
products, and Paper and Pulp, and relative high in Basic Metal Industries, Fabricated Metal 
Products and Other Industries. 
  Real wages grew over the period 1975-99, by almost 200 percent for white-collar 
workers and around 130 percent for blue-collar workers. The wage ratios between foreign owned 
and private-domestically owned plants are shown in table 2.  In 1975, wages were about three 
times as high in foreign- owned plants as in private domestic plants. The wage differences have 
gradually decreased over time and in 1999 were 44 percent for blue-collar workers and 68 
percent for white-collar workers. The difference in blue collar- wages has been high in Food 
products, Paper and Pulp, Chemicals and Non-Metallic Minerals, and in white-collar wages in 
Food products, Non-Metallic Minerals, Fabricated Metal Industries, and Other Industries.  
                                                       
3 A foreign plant is defined as one with any foreign ownership. Most foreign plants are joint 
ventures with a majority foreign ownership.   5 
White-collar wages have sometimes been higher in private domestic than in foreign- owned 
plants in Basic Metal Products.
4 
A frequently mentioned source of possible selectivity bias is foreign takeovers of high-
wage domestically- owned plants.  If foreign firms tended to take over the plants with the highest 
average wage, either nationally, within industries, within regions, or within industries within 
regions, a cross- section analysis would find that foreign- owned establishments paid higher 
wages than domestically- owned establishments.  However, increases in foreign shares would 
have no effect on average wages and would be associated with lower wages in domestically- 
owned plants.   
The best way to judge the effects of foreign ownership is to follow cases in which 
takeovers took place.  We first examine wage levels in target plants before takeovers to learn 
whether it is the selection of domestic firms for takeover that produces the higher wages 
observed in foreign- owned plants. We then calculate the changes in wage levels that followed 
takeovers, relative to wage changes in domestically- owned Indonesian manufacturing plants, to 
see whether differential wage changes could account for the higher wages in foreign-owned 
plants.  
Table 3 shows the number of domestic takeovers of foreign-owned plants and the number 
of foreign takeovers of domestically-owned plants from 1975 to 1999.  Foreign takeover is 
defined as an ownership change where the foreign ownership goes from zero to a positive value. 
Domestic takeover is defined as an ownership change where the foreign ownership goes from a 
positive value to zero. Both types of takeovers typically include plants with majority foreign 
ownership: the average foreign ownership share is 76 percent in foreign takeovers and 73 percent 
                                                       
4 See Hill (1990) and Manning (1998) for other studies on wages in Indonesian manufacturing.   6 
in firms the year before a domestic takeover. Fewer than one percent of the total number of 
plants changed ownership from domestic to foreign or from foreign to domestic in each year. 
However, the number increased over time, especially foreign takeovers.  They grew from an 
average of 23 per year between 1975-1989 to 90 per year between 1990-1999. The sharp 
increase in foreign takeovers was caused by the previously mentioned liberalization of the FDI 
regime that has taken place in Indonesia since the mid 1980s. Domestic takeovers of foreign-
owned plants also increased, but not as much, from 29 per year in the first period to 64 per year 
in the 1990s.   
 Plants involved in takeovers in both directions, foreign of domestically-owned plants and 
domestic of foreign-owned plants, were larger, on average, than existing domestically-owned 
plants, overall and in almost every industry group in each period.  However, takeovers in both 
directions were considerably smaller than existing foreign-owned plants. Foreign takeovers were, 
on average larger than domestic takeovers, but the margin was small overall and not consistent 
among industry groups.  Thus, with respect to size, takeovers were not a random selection among 
domestically-owned or foreign-owned plants.  Foreign takeovers were biased toward the larger 
domestically-owned plants and domestic takeovers toward the smaller foreign-owned plants. 
Table 4 answers the question as to whether foreign firms paid high wages on average 
simply because they took over high-wage local firms. The table shows the wages one year and 
two years before a foreign takeover of a private domestically-owned plant relative to wages in all 
private domestically-owned plants, within the same industry and in the same year. It also shows 
the same information for foreign-owned plants that were taken over by domestic owners. 
  Plants taken over by foreigners paid blue collar wages somewhat above the average in all 
privately owned plants. The differentials were in the range of 10 to 20 per cent, far below the   7 
differential in table 2.  In no case was the differential statistically significant. For white-collar 
employees, the contrast was even more striking. While existing foreign-owned plants paid 60-70 
per cent more to such employees, the target firms, before takeover, had been paying them about 
average wages for privately-owned plants. Thus there is no evidence that the differentials in 
existing plants resulted from selective acquisition of high- wage domestically-owned plants. 
  The evidence for selectivity relative to domestic wage levels (but not foreign- owned 
plant wage levels) is stronger for domestic takeovers of foreign-owned plants.  White-collar 
wages in domestic takeovers were at about average for domestically-owned plants, but blue-
collar wages were about 30 per cent higher.  However, although domestic firms were acquiring 
foreign-owned plants with blue-collar wage levels well above average domestic levels, they were 
not as much above as in the average foreign plant, and the margin over domestically-owned 
plants was not statistically significant, except in two industries, Food Products and Chemicals, 
where both blue and white-collar wages were significantly above the domestic plant averages.  
Thus, domestic takeovers of foreign- owned plants were of plants that paid relatively low wages 
for foreign- owned plants, particularly relatively low white- collar wages, except in Food 
products and Chemicals. 
  Taken together, the two sets of averages suggest, first, that any tendency of foreign 
takeovers of domestic plants to be biased toward high-wage domestic plants was slight and did 
not come close to accounting for most of the differentials found in existing plants between 
foreign and domestic owners. Second, the fact that domestic takeovers of foreign-owned plants 
were biased toward plants with higher wages than existing domestic plants tended to reduce the 
wage differential between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants.   8 
  Given the starting point for foreign takeovers described in Table 4, we can observe the 
events that followed for the target plants in Table 5.  For manufacturing as a whole, 
domestically-owned plants taken over by foreign firms enjoyed large wage increases relative to 
existing domestically- owned plants.  Blue-collar wages, which had been about 20 per cent above 
average, unweighted, before takeover, increased by 30 percentage points relative to average 
domestic plant wages, averaging around 50 per cent higher after 2 years of foreign ownership, 
although neither of these margins was statistically significant.  Weighted by sector employment, 
they had been only 5- 10 per cent above average before foreign takeover but were 63 per cent 
higher two years after takeover, and both these margins were statistically significant.  White- 
collar wage levels, had been close to average before takeover, unweighted, and about 10 per cent 
below, weighted.  They rose even faster after takeover than blue- collar wages.  After 2 years of 
foreign ownership, wages in the target plants were 84 per cent higher than average white-collar 
wages, unweighted, and 59 per cent higher, weighted, but only the difference in the unweighted 
ratios was significant.   
  There is a lot of variation among the five industry groups for which there are sufficient 
numbers of observations. Blue-collar wages increased significantly relative to industry average 
wages in three of the five and white-collar wages in four out of five. After two years of foreign 
ownership, outside of industry group 33, wages in foreign-owned target plants ranged from 30 to 
more than 100 per cent above the average in private domestically-owned plants, and in half the 
cases, the difference was statistically significant, at least at the 10 per cent level. 
  The story was very different in plants that passed from foreign to domestic ownership.  
Blue-collar wages, which had been about 30 per cent above the average in private domestically-
owned plants when these plants were foreign- owned, rose more slowly than average and after   9 
two years of domestic ownership were only around 17 per cent above average, both weighted 
and unweighted.  However, it should be noted that differences in blue-collar wages are 
statistically insignificant both before and after the takeover. White-collar wages rose but not 
significantly, according to the unweighted comparisons, and remained the same in relative terms 
according to the weighted calculations. After two years of domestic ownership, they were still 
somewhat above domestic average wages, but by nowhere near as much as the wages in the 
plants moving into foreign ownership or the plants in foreign ownership throughout our period. 
In the five industry groups, seven out of 10 comparisons show declines in wage levels, two 
significantly, relative to the averages. Four out of the ten comparisons showed these plants to 
have lower than average wage levels after a period of domestic ownership, although none 
significantly. 
  The simple comparison between foreign takeovers with takeovers by domestic firms is 
one test of whether the wage increases we see in the former group are the result simply of 
takeovers, regardless of ownership. The results suggest that the change to foreign ownership 
rather than the change in ownership itself is the main source of the wage increases that produced 
high wage levels. 
 
III. Econometric Estimations 
The previous discussion suggests that foreign plants pay relative high wages and that 
foreign takeovers of domestic plants raise both blue- and white-collar wages. Moreover it 
seemed that high wages before takeover in domestic plants acquired by foreigners explain only a 
very minor part of the higher wages in foreign plants.  We continue with an econometric analysis   10 
to further examine the wage difference by estimating different variations of the following 
equation: 
it it it it it e e s l b + + + + + + = Tim Region Sector X ln ownership W ln .                (1) 
where i and t index plants and years respectively. W is average plant wage, and ownership is a 
dummy variable for foreign or government ownership.
5 X is a vector with plant specific 
characteristics such as size, and the use of electricity and other inputs. Sector dummy variables, 
at a 2-digit level of ISIC, regional dummy variables, and time dummy variables control for 
sector, regional or time specific wage effects. s is a plant specific effect , which will be 
estimated both as a random and as a fixed effect.  
The effect of foreign ownership on wages estimated from Equation 1 is seen in table 6. 
The results in the first two columns, within industries, regions, and years, show that foreign- 
owned establishments paid 0.67 more in log terms (about 95 percent) for blue- collar workers 
and 0.90 more in log terms (about 150 percent) for white- collar workers. Some of that difference 
is associated with the characteristics of the individual plants, such as their size and their inputs of 
energy (as a proxy for capital intensity), and other intermediate inputs, all of which are correlated 
with their ownership. If we include these characteristics as explanatory variables, thus attributing 
the association with wages to them, rather than to foreign ownership, the differential is much 
reduced, to around .29 for blue- collar workers and over .43 for white- collar workers (columns 2 
and 3). Finally, the fixed effect estimates examine variations within plants. Variables that do not 
change over time will be fully absorbed by the plant specific fixed effects. In equations with 
                                                       
5 Foreign plants include plants with any amount of foreign ownership. Government ownership is 
defined as plants with no foreign ownership and any amount of government ownership.   11 
plant-specific fixed effects, foreign ownership represents wages only in the foreign ownership 
period of plants that changed ownership, and these wage levels are compared with each plant’s 
wages when it was domestically owned. Hence, the coefficient captures the effect of foreign 
ownership both in plants moving from foreign to domestic ownership, and in plants moving from 
domestic to foreign ownership. If plant fixed effects are introduced, along with plant 
characteristics, as in the last two columns, the remaining differentials are around .10 and .21.   
We also tried to include random effect estimations but the assumption of no correlation 
between the error term and the independent variables was strongly rejected by a Hausman test. 
Plants with any foreign equity are classified as foreign owned in the above analysis. The 
effect on wages might differ depending on the share of foreign ownership.
6 For instance, a 
majority foreign ownership share might be required for bringing in technologies from the parent 
firm, which in turn might cause a higher wage premium in such foreign majority owned plants. 
We therefore divide foreign ownership in plants with a majority foreign ownership share and 
plants with a minority foreign share. The results are shown in table 7. Both majority- and 
minority owned foreign plants pay higher wages than local plants. Majority-owned plants pay 
higher wages than minority-owned plants for white collar workers but lower for blue collar 
workers. None of the differences between foreign majority- and minority wages are significant at 
a five per cent level. Further estimations showed that as little as a five percent foreign equity 
share resulted in a statistically significant wage premium (not shown). 
                                                       
6 Takii and Ramstetter (2005) find, for instance, a difference in productivity levels among 
Indonesian plants depending on the share of foreign ownership, where majority foreign 
ownership is associated with relatively high levels of productivity.   12 
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian manufacturing sector has changed substantially 
over the studied period. For instance, the period up until the mid-1980s was characterized by 
import substitution policies, and foreign firms present in Indonesia during this time were 
primarily supplying the domestic market. Since then, Indonesia has become increasingly more 
open, resulting in large inflows of export oriented FDI. It is possible that the wage premium 
differs between the two trade regimes. For instance, foreign firms may have made large rents 
during the import substitution period and shared part of these rents with their workers. On the 
other hand, labor markets may have become more competitive in the later, more open period, 
increasing the competition for the best workers.  We therefore divide our sample in two sub-
periods in table 7. There was a significant wage premium for blue-collar wages only in the latter, 
outward- oriented period, and a relative high wage premium for white-collar workers also in that 
period.
7      
In table 8, we divide foreign-owned plants into three groups.
8  One is “foreign since 
1975”, plants that have been foreign- owned throughout the period they are in our data.  A 
second is “foreign takeovers”, plants that had previously been domestically owned during the 
period, but are observed after foreign takeover. The third is “foreign, pre-domestic takeover” 
which is foreign-owned plants that were later taken over by domestic owners, observed in the 
period prior to domestic takeover.  The “foreign since 1975” category includes plants established 
as foreign- owned during our period and never taken over by domestic firms, but also plants that 
                                                       
7 Note, however, that the wage premium for white-collar workers in foreign plants is not 
statistically different at a five percent level between the two periods. 
8 We are greatly indebted to a referee for suggesting this procedure.   13 
were established or taken over by foreign firms before 1975, and never changed to domestic 
ownership.
9  
We also divide domestically-owned plants into “domestic, pre-foreign takeover,” those 
that were later acquired by foreign firms, observed during their pre-takeover life, and “domestic 
takeovers,” those that had been foreign-owned during our period, but were taken over by 
domestic firms, observed after domestic takeover. The category with no dummy variable, the 
omitted category, is establishments that were domestically-owned throughout the period  
It is seen that plants taken over by foreign owners, after takeovers, as well as plants that 
had always been foreign owned, paid comparatively high wages. The wage premium, relative to 
plants that were always domestic during our period, in foreign takeovers is 0.49 in log terms for 
blue-collar wages and 0.74 in log terms for white-collar wages, broadly in line with the results in 
Table 6 for foreign ownership in general. This might be seen as the total relative wage effect 
from foreign takeovers. However, some of this effect is associated with an increase in size or by 
changes in other plant characteristics after a change in ownership. Controlling for such changes 
can be thought of as capturing the “pure” effect of ownership changes. This explains why the 
relative wage differences decrease to about .23 for blue-collar wages and .37 for white-collar 
wages after inclusion of the control variables. The coefficients for Foreign takeovers are only 
marginally smaller than for Foreign since 1975.  That suggests that relative wages in formerly 
domestic-private plants converge towards wages in established foreign plants after the domestic 
plants are taken over by foreign firms. The coefficients for Domestic takeover are positive and 
                                                       
9 We experimented with excluding plants with foreign ownership in 1975 since we cannot be 
sure they haven’t been taken over in a previous year. The exclusion did not have much effect on 
the results.   14 
statistically significant at around .06 and  .10 when plant characteristics are included, much 
smaller than the coefficients for foreign takeovers, and considerably smaller than the coefficients 
for Foreign pre-domestic takeover. Thus, after domestic takeovers, wages fell relative to those in 
plants in domestic hands since 1975, but remained above those in plants remaining in domestic 
hands.  
The fixed effect estimates answer a different question. They reflect differences in 
absolute wage levels rather than in wages relative to those in plants domestically-owned 
throughout. Plants that were objects of foreign takeovers had post-acquisition blue-collar wages 
higher than pre-acquisition wages by about .17 and white-collar wages higher by about .33. 
These estimates also suggest a positive effect on absolute wage levels from domestic takeovers, 
but substantially smaller than from foreign takeovers.  Post-acquisition wages in domestic 
takeovers were higher than pre-acquisition wages by .04 for blue-collar workers and .07 for 
white-collar workers, about one quarter of the differences between pre-acquisition and post-
acquisition wages in foreign takeovers.  
It can also be noted that in the fixed-effect equations in Table 8, as well as in Tables 6 
and 7, the effect of size on blue-collar wages is negative, implying that the additional blue-collar 
workers added in employment expansions are hired at lower wages than existing workers, but 
that is not the case for white-collar workers. For them, larger size seems to be associated with 
higher wage levels. 
Selectivity bias in takeovers might be a source of concern; for example, takeovers of 
Indonesian plants by foreign owners might not be a random process but might be caused by some 
factor that would have an effect on wages even without the takeover. The standard procedure to   15 
address selectivity concerns is through an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
10 However, we 
were unsuccessful in attempts to derive IV estimates. One problem is that the share of takeovers, 
foreign- and domestic, is less than one percent of the total number of plants. Moreover, most 
variables that affect takeovers, such as size, are also correlated with wages and therefore not 
suitable as instruments. As a result, we can only note that selectivity in takeovers could 
conceivably be a source of bias.  
Since most takeovers are concentrated in a few sectors, we run the fixed effects 
estimations for absolute wage levels at a sector level in table 9. There are positive effects of 
foreign takeovers on absolute wages in all five sectors, ranging between .11 and .24 for blue-
collar wages and between .20 and .44 for white-collar wages. The result for domestic takeovers 
is less clear, with a positive and statistically significant coefficient for blue-collar wages in three 
sectors and a negative and significant in two, and a positive effect for white-collar wages in two 
sectors, and a negative in one. Hence, it seems that foreign takeovers have a substantial positive 
effect on absolute average wages across the whole range of industries.  
This finding that average wages rise after takeovers does not necessarily imply that 
individual workers’ wages increase with foreign ownership. An increase in the average wage 
might come, for example, through the dismissal of low-wage workers. We therefore examined 
changes in employment after takeovers (not shown). Foreign takeovers consistently raised the 
number of blue-collar workers and reduced the number of white-collar workers. Domestic 
                                                       
10 An alternative would be to use Heckman’s (1978, 1979) method for endogeneity bias 
corrected OLS estimator. However, Vella and Verbeek (1999) have shown that the IV method 
generates comparable estimates. See also Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002: 99-
100).   16 
takeovers of foreign owned plants had a consistent negative effect on the number of white-collar 
workers and a more uncertain effect on the number of blue-collar workers. However, including 
growth in employment in the regressions has only a marginal effect on the coefficient for 
Foreign takeovers and no effect on the coefficient for Domestic takeovers.  The implication is 
that the change in employment is not the major explanation for the change in wages following a 
takeover.
11  
It is conceivable that there might have been average wage effects from the substitution of 
more highly educated workers for those with less education. Unfortunately, data on worker 
education levels are available for only a few years. Within the one and two- year spans covered 
by the education data, there are no indications of major changes in the education mix of the labor 
force after foreign takeovers (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2002). However, we cannot be certain that 
worker education levels did not change sharply in other periods. 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Foreign – owned establishments in Indonesia, as in other countries, pay higher wages 
than domestically- owned establishments, even when industry, region, plant characteristics, and 
worker characteristics are taken into account. What has not been so obvious is whether these 
higher wages are a consequence of foreign ownership itself or are associated with persistent plant 
characteristics, unknown in nature, but not determined by foreign ownership. This paper 
examines the question in two ways. The first involves separating firms into those taken over by 
foreigners from domestic owners, those taken over by domestic owners from foreigners, and 
                                                       
11 See the working paper version of this paper for more information on the change in 
employment after takeovers and how this affects wages (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2002).   17 
those not changing ownership. We examine wage levels in establishments before they are taken 
over, to learn whether foreign firms select high- wage plants to acquire, and we examine wage 
changes after takeover. We conclude from these simple mean comparisons that, while 
establishments acquired by foreigners had previously paid somewhat above-average blue-collar, 
but not white-collar, wages, the differences were far too small to account for the wage 
differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned plants in general. 
The second method involves an econometric analysis of the relation of average plant 
wage levels to foreign ownership and changes in foreign ownership, taking account of other 
influences on wage levels. 
Foreign firms tended to take over large domestic plants.  These plants had above average 
domestic-private blue-collar wages, although not as high as those in foreign- owned plants in 
general, and slightly above average white-collar wages. After foreign takeovers, both white 
collar and blue-collar wages in these plants rose strongly, especially the white- collar wages.   
Domestic takeovers targeted relatively small foreign plants with blue- and white-collar 
wages that were lower than the foreign average but higher than the domestic average. The effect 
of domestic takeovers on wages is unclear; often positive but small, and at times negative. 
Hence, it does not seem to be takeovers themselves that explains most of the increased wages, 
but the change in ownership from domestic to foreign.  
An econometric analysis of wages using the whole panel of data, found that foreign 
ownership, in an equation that included time, industry, and region dummies, was associated with 
blue collar wages two- thirds higher than in domestically- owned private plants, and white- collar 
wages almost twice as high.  Many of these wage differences were associated with plant   18 
characteristics, such as size and input use, and when these were introduced, the foreign plant 
margins were reduced to about 30 and 40 per cent.   
A further analysis distinguished plants taken over during the period from those foreign-
owned throughout the period and from domestic takeovers.  It found that both foreign ownership 
and foreign takeover result in blue- collar wages about 30 per cent above the average for private 
plants remaining domestically-owned throughout, and white- collar wages 40 to 45 per cent 
higher, even holding constant time, industry, and region. Domestic takeovers of foreign-owned 
plants resulted in small increases in absolute wage levels, but declines relative to plants always 
remaining domestically-owned, although wages remained above the average domestic plant 
level. 
From all of these analyses, we conclude that foreign ownership or acquisition of an 
Indonesian manufacturing plant results in higher wages for the plant’s employees, and that 
domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned plants do not result in corresponding wage gains.  
Foreign ownership and foreign acquisition increase wages relative to domestic ownership and 
even domestic acquisition.  19 
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TABLE 1 
 
THE FOREIGN SHARE OF INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY BETWEEN 
1975-1999 AT A 2-DIGIT LEVEL OF ISIC (%) 
 
1975  1985  1995  1999  Sector  ISIC 
Empl.  VA  Empl.  VA  Empl.  VA  Empl.  VA 
Total    8.5  22.9  10.0  21.4  17.8  30.5  20.7  35.7 
                   
Food products  31  4.0  21.4  4.0  11.7  6.2  11.7  8.0  15.5 
Textiles  32  7.8  26.5  11.3  29.1  23.5  25.1  24.8  37.5 
Wood   33  11.2  23.9  11.7  13.3  8.0  13.2  10.4  20.0 
Paper  34  7.1  16.9  5.6  9.6  16.3  32.1  14.3  21.6 
Chemicals  35  16.9  28.6  14.0  27.7  16.7  43.0  17.7  45.4 
Non-metallic 
Minerals  36  10.3  16.2  8.4  42.0  10.0  25.2  12.7  37.7 
Basic Metal Industries 37  12.7  15.8  20.0  12.8  17.6  41.6  25.2  43.0 
Fabricated Metals  38  18.1  22.7  18.2  29.7  34.1  48.4  44.2  57.4 
Other Manufacturing  39  4.2  1.6  12.9  41.2  40.0  61.3  44.5  53.9 
 
Note: Empl. – Employment. VA- Value Added. 
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TABLE 2 
 
THE RATIOS OF AVERAGES WAGES IN FOREIGN-OWNED TO THOSE IN PRIVATE-
DOMESTICALLY OWNED PLANTS IN THE SAME YEAR BETWEEN 1975-1999 AT A 2-
DIGIT LEVEL OF ISIC 
 
1975  1985  1990  1999 
















Total  2.80  3.11  2.27  1.81  1.67  1.70  1.44  1.68 
                 
31  4.10  4.64  3.55  1.98  1.94  1.70  1.70  2.11 
32  2.21  3.15  1.46  1.55  1.13  1.28  1.31  1.69 
33  1.24  1.24  1.18  1.27  1.23  1.53  1.12  1.49 
34  2.56  4.44  1.74  2.42  1.80  1.18  1.79  1.22 
35  3.98  2.81  2.98  1.96  1.97  2.24  1.79  1.41 
36  4.69  4.75  2.66  2.02  2.63  2.06  2.19  1.71 
37  0.86  1.30  1.45  0.69  1.31  1.28  1.04  0.80 
38  1.58  1.48  1.85  1.73  1.49  1.54  1.29  1.96 
39  0.76  1.00  1.61  2.28  1.45  2.16  1.16  2.08 
 
Note: Average wages for private domestically-owned and foreign-owned plants have been 
calculated at a 3-digit level of ISIC and aggregated up to a 2-digit level of ISIC using shares of 
total blue-collar and white-collar employees as weights. See table 1 for sector names   24 
TABLE 3 
 
THE NUMBER AND AVERAGE SIZE OF TAKEOVERS IN THE INDONESIAN 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 1975-1999 
 
  Average Size 
Sector 
No. of Takeovers 
Takeovers  Existing Plants 
  Domestic  Foreign  Foreign  Domestic  Foreign  Domestic 
             
1975-1989           
Total  408  326  250  210  358  103 
             
31  116  92  219  160  303  105 
32  96  80  265  243  732  105 
33  50  37  290  230  368  136 
34  15  6  42  79  263  78 
35  47  45  297  309  230  113 
36  28  19  192  264  423  54 
37  4  1  61  401  477  248 
38  48  39  283  150  318  110 
39  4  7  124  98  241  69 
             
1990-1999           
Total  637  917  426  418  539  153 
             
31  95  127  316  226  358  119 
32  177  226  681  701  1054  210 
33  85  92  367  363  471  188 
34  16  23  285  795  633  134 
35  90  150  281  233  283  158 
36  33  44  385  357  447  75 
37  8  13  177  224  292  221 
38  106  205  379  310  453  135 
39  27  37  481  339  568  120 
 
Note: Foreign takeovers are takeovers of domestically-owned plants and domestic takeovers are 
takeovers only of foreign-owned plants. Size is the average number of total employees.  See table 1 for 
sector names.  25 
TABLE 4 
 
WAGES IN TARGET ESTABLISHMENTS RELATIVE TO ALL PRIVATE DOMESTIC 
ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE SAME YEAR 
 
    Foreign takeovers of private-domestic plants Private-domestic takeovers of foreign plants 
    T-2  T-1  T-2  T-1 
  Unweighted         
















           
  Weighted by sector employment       
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Note: T-2 (T-1) refers to two (one) years before the year of the takeover. Standard errors within brackets. ***) 
significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at the ten percent level.   26 
TABLE 5 
 
CHANGES AND LEVELS AFTER TAKEOVER IN THE RATIO OF WAGES IN TARGET 
ESTABLISHMENTS TO WAGES IN ALL DOMESTIC PRIVATELY-OWNED 
ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE SAME YEAR 
 
    Foreign takeovers of private-domestic plants Private-domestic takeovers of foreign plants 
    Changes  Levels  Changes  Levels 
    (T+2)-(T-1)  T+2  (T+2)-(T-1)  T+2 
  Unweighted        
















           
  Weighted by sector employment       
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Note. Standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the five percent 
level; *)significant at the ten percent level. 
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TABLE 6 
 
THE RELATION OF AVERAGE PLANT WAGE TO OWNERSHIP AND PLANT 
CHARACTERISTICS 1975-1999 
 (DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LOG AVERAGE WAGE PER EMPLOYEE) 
 












































































Time dummies  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated 
Industry dummies  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  --  -- 
Regional 
dummies 
estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  --  -- 
Establishment 
fixed effect 
--  --  --  --  estimated  estimated 
R-square  0.64  0.53  0.72  0.61  0.66  0.57 
Number of plants  47,297  40,838  45,448  39,531  45,448  39,531 
No of 
observations 
336,576  269,536  316,031  256,852  316,031  256,852 
 
Note: Robust (Cluster at plant level) standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent 
level;  **) significant at the five percent level;  *)significant at the ten percent level. 
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TABLE 7 
 
THE RELATION OF AVERAGE PLANT WAGE TO DIFFERENT LEVELS  
OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND DURING DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS  
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LOG AVERAGE WAGE PER EMPLOYEE) 
 




Blue Collar  White 
Collar 
Blue Collar  White 
Collar 
      1975-86  1975-86  1987-99  1987-99 

































---  ---  ---  --- 
















































Time dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Establishment fixed 
effect 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
R-square  0.66  0.57  0.50  0.42  0.43  0.35 
Number of plants  45,448  39,531  18,854  16,048  38,718  33,545 
No of observations  316,031  256,852  94,084  73,509  221,947  183,343 
Note: Robust (Cluster at plant level) standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one 
percent level;  **) significant at the five percent level; *)significant at the ten percent level.  29 
TABLE 8 
 
THE RELATION OF AVERAGE PLANT WAGE TO CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP AND 
PLANT CHARACTERISTICS 1975-1999 (DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LOG AVERAGE 
WAGE PER EMPLOYEE) 
 
  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar 


























































































Energy per worker 
 








Inputs per worker 
 


















Time dummies  estimated  estimated  Estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated 
Industry dummies  estimated  estimated  Estimated  estimated  --  -- 
Regional dummies  estimated  estimated  Estimated  estimated  --  -- 
Fixed effect  --  --  --  --  estimated  estimated 
R-square  0.64  0.53  0.72  0.61  0.66  0.56 
No of plants  47,297  40,838  45,448  39,531  45,448  39,531 
No of observations  336,576  269,536  316,031  256,852  316,031  256,852 
 
Note: Robust (Cluster at plant level) standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) 
significant at the five percent level; *)significant at the ten percent level. Domestic takeovers refers only to 




THE RELATION OF AVERAGE PLANT WAGE TO OWNERSHIP CHANGES AND PLANT CHARACTERISTICS AT A 
SECTOR LEVEL (DEPENDENT VARIABLE – LOG AVERAGE WAGE PER EMPLOYEE) 
 
Food Products (ISIC 
31) 
Textiles (ISIC 32)  Wood Products  
(ISIC 33) 
Chemicals (ISIC 35)  Fabricated Metal 






































































































































































Time dummies  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated 
Fixed effect  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated  estimated 
R-square  0.66  0.55  0.77  0.63  0.56  0.49  0.68  0.54  0.70  0.58 
No of plants  11,677  10,024  11,304  8,967  6,609  5,991  5,144  4,954  4,929  4,608 
No of observations  87,632  67,982  74,580  54,155  35,455  31,207  36,925  34,615  32,929  30,069 
 
Note: Robust (Cluster at plant level) standard errors within brackets. ***) significant at the one percent level; **) significant at the 
five percent level; *)significant at the ten percent level. Domestic takeovers refers only to takeovers of foreign-owned plants. 
 